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Basic Energy Serv. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n., 666 F. App'x 364 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 
An ALJ found that an operator of mobile oil and gas 
rigs failed to meet the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) standard for “fixed stairs” 
and guardrails on their mobile rigs.  The operator 
argued first that applying these two standards to mobile 
rigs creates an absurd result. The court rejected that 
argument based on the OSHA Secretary’s definition of 
“fixed stairs,” meaning “attached in some way to 
prevent movement,” as opposed to the operator’s 
definition—“permanently attached.” The court defers to 
the Secretary’s interpretation if it is consistent with 
regulatory language and not otherwise unreasonable. 
The operator next argued that stairs on mobile rigs fall 
into an exception for “articulated stairs.”  The court 
noted that, although mobile rigs have multiple, 
independently articulated sections, these rigs do not fall 
into the exception, which targets stairs with base 
support that rises and falls. The court finally refused to 
consider the operator’s argument that the guardrail 
provision does not apply to mobile rigs, due to 





Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar 
Steel Minnesota LLC, 843 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 
A natural gas pipeline owner-operator brought a breach 
of contract suit against a customer to enforce 
performance of monthly payments in exchange for 
transporting natural gas to the customer. The district 
court held that it had federal question jurisdiction under 
the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). The Eighth Circuit held 
that nothing in the NGA allowed a breach of contract 
claim in federal court and vacated the district court’s 




Buccaneer Energy (USA) Inc. v. Gunnison Energy 
Corp., 846 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
A startup natural gas producer filed an antitrust action 
against established competitors for violation of sections 
one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The new 
producers sought an agreement to transport natural gas  
 
through the old producers’ pipelines. The district 
court dismissed the new producer’s claim. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that the essential facilities 
doctrine did not apply because the evidence presented 
by the new producer involved a larger, more 
expensive pipeline, which did not exist at the time of 
the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Therefore, the 
court could not conclusively find that the new 
producers faced a barrier to entry into the market due 
to cost concerns. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the new producer failed to show how the old 
producers exhibited anticompetitive behavior under 
the rule of reason standard. The new producer never 
explicitly sought this standard and failed to provide 
evidence defining a relevant geographic market, 
market power, and product market as it related to 






Chevron USA, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 387 
P.3d 25 (Alaska 2016). 
 
In an administrative decision, the Department of 
Revenue (“DOR”) treated separate oil and gas fields 
operated by common producers as a single entity 
when calculating the producers’ tax obligations. The 
DOR had determined that the separate fields were 
“economically interdependent” within the meaning of 
a tax-aggregation statute because the fields could “be 
reasonably treated as an economically unitary 
activity.” The producers appealed, arguing that DOR 
effectively promulgated a regulation without 
following the requisite procedures. The state supreme 
court held that the decision was not a regulation but 
rather a “commonsense interpretation” of the tax-
aggregation statute, which did not trigger the 
requisite procedures. The decision added no specific 
criteria to the tax-aggregation statute’s terms, instead 
merely clarifying its language. Moreover, the 
“commonsense interpretation” was narrowly tailored 
to the case’s facts and was foreseeable given the 













Encana Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Brammer Eng'g, Inc., No. 
51,045-CA, 2016 WL 6776075 (La. App. 2 Cir. Nov. 
11, 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 5, 2017).    
Operators filed a concurcus proceeding to resolve a 
contract dispute between mineral owners and their 
agent regarding royalty-based compensation to the 
agent. The mineral owners believed the contract 
required the agent to reserve an additional free 
overriding royalty fee on their behalf to trigger the 
agency’s own compensation in the overriding royalty 
interest. The dispute arose after a third-party 
approached the agent with a bid package to extract 
resources near the mineral owners’ interests, but the 
agent negotiated an overriding royalty interest only for 
his own compensation, per his interpretation of the 
earlier contract. The district court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of the agent, and the 
owners appealed. The state appellate court found the 
contract’s language unambiguous, concluding that it 
required the agent to reserve an additional royalty 
interest for the mineral owners beyond a lessor’s 
royalty to earn compensation himself from an 
overriding royalty interest.   
 
Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, 2016-468, 2016 WL 
7402427 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. Dec. 21, 2016), reh’g 
denied (Jan. 25, 2017). 
  
A lessor appealed the judgment in favor of a lessee for 
failure to make royalty payments under the mineral 
lease. The lease contained a one-fifth royalty provision 
of all oil and gas produced. The lessee subsequently 
sought to pool the lessor’s interest into a production 
unit. The state regulatory agency approved the unit and 
issued a conditional allowable and an effective date for 
the unit.  The lessor argued that, up to the effective date 
of the unit, the lessee owed royalty payments according 
to the lease. The lessee contended, in contrast, that the 
conditional allowable, as defined by the state regulatory 
agency, governed the royalty payment to lessors and 
abrogated the lease terms.  The court rejected the 
lessee’s argument; the conditional allowable does not 
abrogate the lease terms prior to the effective date of 
the unit. Unless explicitly stated by the agency’s 
unitization order, the terms of the mineral lease govern 
the relationship between lessor and lessee until the 









Aruba Petroleum, Inc. v. Parr, No. 05-14-01285-CV, 
2017 WL 462340 (Tex. App. Feb. 1, 2017).  
 
In a memorandum opinion, a state appellate court 
reversed a jury verdict that held an operator liable for 
damages under private nuisance theory. Landowners 
sued the operator for “environmental contamination 
and polluting events,” resulting in a verdict against 
the operator for over $2.9 million. The operator 
appealed, arguing that the evidence in the record did 
not support the jury’s finding of intentional private 
nuisance. The appellate court relied on Crosstex 
North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, No. 15-0049, 
2016 WL 3483165 (Tex. June 24, 2016) for the 
proposition that a defendant intentionally creates a 
nuisance when it “actually desired or intended to 
create the interference” or actually knew or believed 
“that the interference would result.” Evidence that the 
operator intentionally engaged in conduct that caused 
the interference will not suffice to establish an 
intentional nuisance. Although evidence supported 
the landowners’ claims of correspondence between 
employees of the operator and the operator’s affiliate 
firms and complaints filed with state environmental 
agency, the landowners did not cite evidence 
establishing the operator intended or desired to create 
an interference with the landowners’ enjoyment of 
property.  
 
Denbury Green Pipeline v. Texas Rice Land, No. 15-
0225, 2017 WL 65470 (Tex. Jan. 6, 2017). 
  
A pipeline company applied for and received 
“common carrier” status from the Texas Railroad 
Commission, which allowed them to condemn land 
for a carbon dioxide pipeline. Landowners attempted 
to stop the pipeline from crossing their land. The 
pipeline company filed for a temporary and 
permanent injunction; in the case’s second 
appearance before the Texas Supreme Court, the 
Court determined that the pipeline company was a 
common carrier because it could show a reasonable 
probability that the project would serve the public; 
thus, the right to eminent domain was reasonable. 
The pipeline company had produced sufficient 
evidence of a reasonable probability of serving the 
public at some point in the future. The lower courts’ 
application of “substantial public interest” was 
erroneous: a slight public interest, such as contracting 
to transport carbon dioxide for one or more 
customers, is sufficient for common carrier status. 
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Parker Cty Appraisal Dist. v. Bosque Disposal Sys., 
LLC, 506 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016). 
 
Landowners petitioned to review the tax assessment of 
four subsurface saltwater disposal wells as separate 
property from the surface, causing the landowners to be 
subject to double taxation. The landowners claimed that 
the wells were not separate property interests because 
the surface and subsurface estates were not severed and 
argued that the tax code does not allow double taxation 
of the same property. The Texas tax code and common 
law, however, permit property appraisal based on 
individual characteristics and additionally provide that 
double taxation is not automatic just because a fee 
simple estate overlaps with other taxable categories 
such as leasehold or mineral interest. The separate 
assessment of the disposal wells used an approved 
revenue-based method plus the value of the surface 
based on its market real estate value. Because the 
landowner’s argument was largely based on the 
mistaken understanding of the tax code, the appeals 
court held that the assessor could tax the that wells 
separately from the surfacea and reversed and 
remanded the trial court’s summary judgment for 
landowners. 
 
Richardson v. Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV, 2017 WL 
511893 (Tex. App. Feb. 8, 2017). 
 
Grantees’ successors-in-interest appealed a district 
court finding that a earlier document pertaining to 
minerals under certain property was a lease between the 
grantors and grantees that the grantees had released in a 
later document. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of 
Texas, Tyler held that the earlier document was instead 
an unambiguous mineral deed because the habendum 
and warranty clauses contained the word “forever.” 
“Forever” signaled no limitation or condition on the 
conveyance of the mineral interest to the grantees. 
Additionally, the appeals court held that the later 
document was an unambiguous release of an 
unrecorded lease rather than a release related back to 
the earlier document—the deed. Only three of the six 
signers of the earlier document signed the later release. 
Plus, the later release referred to a definite period for 
the lease to exist, which the earlier document did not 
contain. The appeals court held that the grantees’ 
successors-in-interest still owned the one-half mineral 







Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc, No. 08–15–00080–
CV, 2017 WL 192911 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2017). 
 
The operator of secondary recovery injection wells 
obtained permits from the Texas Railroad 
Commission (“Commission”). A neighboring oil and 
gas developer sought a restraining order and 
injunction, claiming “imminent danger of irreparable 
harm” to its mineral interests. The operator moved to 
dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that § 85.241 of the Texas 
Natural Resources Code (“Code”) requires claims 
against Commission decisions be brought in the 
Commission’s Travis County seat. The operator also 
argued that § 85.321 of the Code prohibits “equitable 
relief” without plaintiff first suffering injury. The 
trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, 
the court held that the Code does not preclude pre-
injury equitable relief but specifically contemplates 
the existence of claims either in Travis County or at 
the “local courthouse” where the threat of the injury 
exists, negating any argument of exclusive 
jurisdiction within Travis County.  
 
 
Westport Oil & Gas Co., L.P. v. Mecom, No. 04-15-
00714-CV, 2016 WL 7234056 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 
14, 2016). 
 
Gas royalty owners brought an action against a gas 
producer for underpayment of royalties. The lease’s 
royalty clause calculates the royalties as a percentage 
of the market value of the gas produced from that 
well. The royalty owners argued that the market 
value is subject to the gas purchase agreement clause, 
which contains a formula for minimum payments of 
gas purchases. The producer paid royalties for the 
strict percentage of market value at the well, which 
was lower than the minimum used in the gas 
purchase agreement clause. However, the appeals 
court found that the plain language of the two clauses 
keeps them independent with no reference to the 
other and no uncertain or doubtful language 
susceptible to more than one meaning. Though the 
royalty payment may use the gas purchase agreement 
formula, in this lease, the gas purchase agreement 
clause only applies to future purchases and the 














7th Circuit  
 
Benton Cty. Wind Farm LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., 
Inc., 843 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2016).            
  
A wind energy producer and a local electricity 
company contracted for the Company to buy 
electricity from the producer’s wind farm for $52 per 
MWh produced and sell it to the grid under 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
(“MISO”) for twenty years.  When the producer’s 
wind farm came online in 2008, it was the only wind 
farm in the area, and the company could purchase 
and sell all 100 megawatts. By 2013, the producer 
was no longer the only wind farm; total generation 
capacity had exceeded total transmission capacity in 
the area, such that MISO now treated wind farms like 
other electrical generation units, requiring 
curtailment. With MISO’s changes, the company 
began bidding $0 for the producer’s wind production 
where the market clearing price was $0 or above, 
even though it paid $52 per MWh produced to 
Producer no matter the market clearing price 
obtained, thus usually operating at a loss. If the 
market clearing price is below $0, then MISO did not 
buy the producer’s generation and the company did 
not pay the producer the $52 per MWh. The company 
did not elect to drop its regular bid below $0, nor did 
it choose to build additional transmission lines to 
increase capacity. The producer sued the company 
for failure to lower the bid price or help increase 
transmission capacity, meaning the company owed 
the producer liquidated damages under the contract. 
The producer did not argue for liquidated damages 
when MISO would not take the producer’s electricity 
for other reasons. The district court found for the 
company. But the appeals court found for the 
producer: non-clearing price bids fell within the 
liquidated damages clause because of the company’s 
“failure to obtain Transmission Services” either by 







City of San Antonio v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, 
506 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App. 2016).  
 
A wholesale electricity market participant had agreed 
to provide non-spinning reserve services to an 
independent systems operator. But due to a 
combination of harsh weather, mechanical failure, 
and questionable management oversight, the state 
public utility company (“PUC”) penalized the market 
participant for violating a state administrative rule by 
failing to perform. The market participant exercised 
its right, under state rule, to seek judicial review of 
the PUC’s decision. The market participant argued 
that the PUC “interpreted and applied” the state rule 
in a “new and novel manner” that conflicted with 
TXU Generation Co., L.P. v. Public Utility 
Commission of Texas, 165 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App. 
2005). The appellate concluded that the PUC did not 
enforce a new interpretation of the state rule because 
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Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co. LLC, 845 
F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2017).   
 
Environmental groups sued to enjoin a coal company 
from allegedly violating the Clean Water Act (“Act”).  
The coal company argued that its permit issued 
pursuant to the Act shielded it from liability. The 
district court agreed with the environmental groups, 
finding that the coal company’s permit required it to 
adopt the state’s water quality standards, even if the 
permit language does not specifically enumerate those 
standards. On appeal, the coal company argued that 
the permit controls the conduct of the state regulator, 
rather than the regulated entity. The court rejected this 
argument, citing that unambiguous language in the 
permit refers to the regulated entity’s actions, not the 
regulator’s actions.  Even if the court found the permit 
ambiguous and used extrinsic evidence to interpret it, 
extrinsic evidence supported the finding that the 
permit required compliance with state water quality 
standards.  The court additionally found that the coal 
company’s disclosure of its planned discharges during 
the permitting process does not shield it from liability. 
The appellate court upheld the lower courts findings 




All. for the Wild Rockies v. Krueger, 664 Fed. App’x 
674 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 
An environmental group moved to enjoin a National 
Forest Service (“NFS”) project, alleging violations of 
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National 
Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and NEPA. The 
trial court found no such violations and granted 
summary judgment for NFS. The group appealed, and 
the court of appeals affirmed: First, NFS had not 
violated ESA because it properly relied on Fish and 
Wildlife Service records, which indicated that no 
grizzly bears inhabited the project area. Moreover, 
NFS had not violated NFMA because it relied on the 
“best available science” in implementing the project 
and ignored no relevant data. Finally, the impact 
statement regarding the project fully addressed the 
perceived environmental effects and thus was not 





Grand Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, 
Inc., 386 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 9, 
2017). 
 
A municipality owns the rights to divert water from 
one river to a river basin to supplement irrigational 
uses. Beginning in 1987, however, the municipality 
diverted water to different, undecreed river basins. The 
municipality also diverted water to a reservoir to be 
used for later supplementation, which was outside of 
its decreed rights, but it had done so with no objection 
since the 1920s. In 2009, it finally filed an Application 
for Change of Water Rights. This application calls for 
a representative study period of beneficial use to 
determine the legitimacy of the need for a change in 
rights. The appeals court found that the law regarding 
transmountain water does not provide for automatic 
rights to store that water in a decree for rights to use 
the direct flow of that water, nor was the right to 
storage implied in the decree. The court required the 
years of undecreed use were to still be included in the 
representative study period needed for the change of 
rights then remanded the case to the Water Division to 




United States v. Barthelmess Ranch Corp., 386 P.3d 
952 (Mont. 2016).  
  
Objectors appealed the Water Court’s decision in 
favor of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), 
which claimed control over five reservoirs and one 
natural pothole lake. The objectors claimed that the 
Water Court erred in both its determination that BLM 
holds rights under Montana law in these reservoirs on 
federal land and that BLM owns reserved rights for 
stockwatering by permittees in the pothole lake under 
federal executive power. The court found BLM’s 
claims to the water arise from its reservoir 
construction, which the objector’s ancestral free 
grazing rights under Montana law does not preclude. 
Further, the enabling statutes and executive order 
properly reserved the pothole lake to the federal 
government; therefore, BLM correctly claimed rights 






Lester v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1778 C.D. 2015, 
2017 WL 127805 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 13, 2017). 
 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental 
Protection (“DEP”) ordered a landowner’s son to 
remove certain underground storage tanks from his 
family’s land. The Environmental Hearing Board 
upheld the order, finding that the landowner’s son 
financially responsible as “operator” of the tanks per 
the spill-prevention statute. The landowner’s son 
appealed, arguing that he was not the operator of the 
tanks. But the court held that he had “managed, 
supervised, altered, controlled, or had responsibility 
for the operation” of the tanks, making him an 
“operator.” Moreover, the landowner’s son had 
claimed operator status in several instances when 
completing DEP forms. The Son also argued that 
because he did not own the tanks, imposing financial 
responsibility on him amounted to a taking. The court 
reasoned, however, that the spill-prevention statute 
was a valid exercise of the state’s police power. 
Because the order served the statute’s purpose of 
eliminating contamination and removing underground 
tanks, requiring tank operators to expend financial 









Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperial Terminal Services, 
LLC, 387 P.3d 670 (Wash. 2017). 
 
Two oil terminal companies operating on the coast of 
Washington wanted to expand their storage 
capabilities to facilitate more traffic. Between the two 
proposals, rail traffic could increase by 973 transits 
(133%) per year and ocean vessel transit would 
increase by 520 transits (310%) per year. The 
Department of Ecology (“DOE”) and the city both 
approved the permits, but an Native American tribe 
and ecological conservation groups (collectively, 
“Petitioners”) challenged the permits. The Petitioners 
claimed that the DOE and city incorrectly applied the 
Ocean Resources Management Act (“ORMA”). The 
Court of Appeals held that the ORMA regulations are 
narrow and do not govern these permits. On appeal, 
the Washington Supreme Court reversed those 
limitations of the ORMA. ORMA intends to protect 
against the dangers of oil transportation on oceanic 
life. The terminal companies argued that their 
proposed activities did not fall within this regulation 
as it was not “transportation” or “ocean uses” as 
defined by the DOE. The Supreme Court also held this 
to be incorrect. For these reasons, the permits required 














Marilley v. Bonham, 844 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 
Non-resident commercial fishermen (“Non-
residents”) filed a class action against the Director of 
a State Fish and Game Department claiming 
violations under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The dispute 
arose under statutory mandates that charged Non-
residents higher fees for fishing licenses, vessel 
registrations, Dungeness crab permits, and herring 
gill net permits (collectively, “fee differentials”). A 
federal district court granted the Non-residents 
summary judgment; the Director appealed. The Ninth 
Circuit reversed. Although the fee differentials 
burdened the Non-residents’ “common calling” to 
commercial fishing, they did not violate the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause because the state 
had a substantial interest in recouping the loss in 
revenue from Non-residents that it could collect from 
state taxpayers. And the fee differentials did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they 
were rationally related to a legitimate state interest of 
recovering the Non-residents’ share of benefit 
provided to them by the state’s management of its 
commercial fishery.  
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